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MORALITY AND ANIMALS 
During the last fifteen or 
twenty years, there have been a 
number of groups (somewhat mislead­
ingly called "liberation movements") 
which have urged that the rights of 
women, blacks, and homosexuals have 
not been properly respected. Now 
these three have been joined by the 
animal liberation movement. In 
terms of the actual pain involved, 
the number of deaths, and even in 
terms of the amount of confinement, 
a good case can be made that animals 
are treated even worse than women, 
blacks and homosexuals. For 
example, in a single year in the 
United States alone at least sixty 
million animals are used as subjects 
for experimentation - most of whom 
are used (and usually killed) to 
test the safety of luxury products 
such as new cosmetics. Animals are 
subjected to confinement in factory 
farms where a hen, for example, is 
likely to be kept permanently in a 
cage in which it cannot even stretch 
its wings. Do human beings really 
have the right to kill animals so that 
we can eat their flesh - particularly 
when we bear in mind that feeding 
grain to animals before we eat them 
rather than eating the grain directly 
is an exceedingly inefficient way 
of feeding human beings? 
The case of the animal libbers 
seems impressive but it has 
encountered determined opposition. 
In the matter of animal experiments 
it is objected that at least those 
cases where the experiments may 
lead to the prevention and cure of 
human ailments, we should recognize 
that animal pain counts far less 
than human pain so that even if the 
experiments cause a greater total 
amount of suffering to animals than 
they prevent in human beings, they can 
still be perfectly justifiable. Some 
would even claim that it is justifiable 
to test new luxury goods, such as 
cosmetics, on animals. (The standard 
test is to inject increasingly large 
amounts of the substance into a group 
of animals until half of them die, 
sometimes simply because of the volume 
of stuff that has been injected.) 
Their argument could start with the 
premise that while the interests of 
animals should be respected, whenever 
there is a conflict between the 
interests of animals and the interests 
of human beings, the interests of 
human beings should take precedence. 
If then it is in the interests of 
human beings to make the new cosmetics 
(consumers enjoy them, manufacturers 
make money and workers gain employment), 
it follows that, however painful the 
experiments may be for the animals 
they are still justifiable. 
Or again it might be argued that 
we don't really know that animals are 
capable of feeling pain: after all, 
you can't feel an animal's pain so you 
can't be sure that it is suffering. In 
the matter of breeding animals to kill 
and use for meat, it has been argued 
that since they wouldn't have been born 
if a farmer hadn't planned eventually 
to use them for meat and since it is 
better to have even a short life than 
none at all, raising animals for meat 
is, at the very least, unobjectionable, 
and in all probability commendable, 
even from the point of view of the 
animals themselves. Finally, it is 
sometimes claimed that animals are by 
their very nature incapable of having 
rights (although this claim is not 
quite as bleak as it appears for 
animal interests because those who make 
the claim usually hold as well that it 
is wrong to do certain things to 
animals and that we even have obliga­
tions to do some things for them). 
Is animal pain less important than 
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human pain? 
Almost all of us start out think­
ing that it is. I do not mean by this 
that we think (quite rightly) that 
there are kinds of mental suffering 
that human beings can undergo that 
animals can't. I mean rather that 
given what seem at least to be 
roughly equal amounts of human 
suffering and animal suffering, the 
human suffering strikes us as vastly 
more important. For example, if we 
learn that animals are being experi­
mented on in order to test a new 
drug that may alleviate human 
suffering, we don't tend to worry 
about whether the chances are that 
more human suffering will be pre­
vented than is being caused to the 
animals. If the experiments were to 
be conducted on human beings, how­
ever, we would react differently: we 
would probably not be willing to 
approve such experiments unless we 
supposed that they would prevent a 
great deal more suffering than they 
caused and even then, many of us 
wouldn't approve of it. 
How could the view that animal 
pain is less important than human 
pain be defended? For most of us the 
initial response would be that 
because human beings are much more 
intelligent than animals, animal pain 
should count far less than human pain. 
It's not, we suppose, that we are 
playing favorites with our own species 
in the way that a racist favors his 
own race or a sexist favors his or 
her own sex. It is not that we have 
taken something that is morally 
neutral like sex or skin color and 
treated it as if it were morally 
relevant, thereby favoring our own 
kind just because they are our own 
kind. We think rather that we have 
observed a crucial difference 
between human beings and the other 
animals which it is appropriate to 
acknowledge by treating human suffer­
ing as far more important than animal 
suffering. 
But is this what we are really 
doing? Are we simply recognizing a 
morally relevant difference between 
human beings and animals - that human 
beings are more intelligent than 
animals - adding the premise that the 
suffering of a less intelligent being 
counts less, and making the obvious 
deduction? If we really accepted 
this principle, we would treat the 
suffering of people of average 
intellect as in itself less important 
than the suffering of highly intelli­
gent people, and the suffering of the 
retarded 'as even less important. But 
surely this would be wrong. Imagine 
having someone who is far more 
intelligent than yourself tell you 
that, because of your inferior 
intelligence, your pain should count 
less than his, or imagine someone 
suggesting that since some very 
retarded people seem less intelligent 
than some dogs upon whom we experi­
ment, we should feel as free to 
experiment on such retarded human 
beings as we now do on dogs or guinea 
pigs or rats. 
It might be argued that even 
though some human beings such as 
babies and some retarded persons are 
less intelligent than the most 
intelligent animals, human beings 
are characteristically more intelli­
gent than animals and that this 
justifies treating babies and persons 
who are unusually retarded with far 
more concern for their pain than we 
would show if they were animals. 
But this argument still relies on 
the assumption that the pain of more 
intelligent creatures counts more 
heavily than that of less intelligent 
ones, an assumption whose full 
implications we are obviously 
unwilling to accept. Also, even if 
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that were correct, why should we treat 
creatures who are not intelligent as 
though they were intelligent simply 
because they belong to a species most 
of whose other members are intelligent? 
It could be replied that we have a 
precedent for doing so in those 
insurance companies that treat young 
people who are unusually safe drivers 
for their age-group as though they 
were no safer than the average for 
their age-group. However, I think we 
would either regard this practice as 
unjustifiable or, if we find it justi­
fiable, we do so only because the 
insurance companies claim that they 
lack sufficient evidence to determine 
which young drivers are the safe ones, 
and that collecting such evidence 
would cost too much to be feasible. 
But in the case of babies and the 
mentally retarded, there is no problem 
in determining their relative lack of 
intelligence. 
Another argument for counting 
animal pain far less heavily than 
human pain is that we can be bound by 
agreements with other human beings 
not to cause them pain, but we cannot 
be bound by such agreements with 
animals because they can't make 
agreements. We could, however, be 
bound by agreements with animal­
lovers not to inflict suffering on 
animals. More important, we quite 
properly feel that it is wrong to 
inflict suffering on other human 
beings even when we haven't agreed 
not to do so, either with them or with 
any other people. Suppose that you 
found an island inhabited by a tribe 
of people with whom neither you nor 
anyone in your society had made any 
agreements, that it was in your 
interest to do something that would 
cause them great distress, and that 
doing that thing would help you far 
less than it would harm them. 
Suppose that you proposed doing it 
and that someone protested that it 
would be wrong. It wouldn't do for 
you to reply that your proposed 
behavior would be perfectly all right 
because you were bound by no agree­
ments with the tribe. Thus it would 
appear that you can have an obliga­
tion not to cause pain even if you 
aren't bound by an agreement not to 
do so, so this argument fails. 
How do we know that animals can 
feel pain? 
It might be argued that we needn't 
worry about causing animals pain 
because we don't know that they are 
capable of feeling pain, or indeed, 
that they have any experiences at 
all. After all, the most you can do 
is hear an animal whimper or howl, or 
see it grimace or tremble or recoil 
or run away. Ydu can't actually feel 
the animal's pain so you can't verify 
the claim that it is suffering; 
consequently, there is no need to act 
as if it is capable of suffering. 
But the same holds true of human 
beings. You can only see the outward 
signs of their suffering. You can 
only feel your own pain, not theirs; 
yet we don't believe that because of 
this it is morally acceptable to act 
as if other human beings never have 
painful experiences. But what 
justification do we have for suppos­
ing that other human beings have 
experiences more or less similar to 
our own? The most commonly employed 
argument is known as the argument 
from analogy for other minds. It is 
argued that in your own case you 
notice on innumerable occasions that 
certain kinds of behavior are 
associated with certain kinds of 
experiences, and that since you 
observe other people behaving in ways 
similar to your own, you are entitled 
to infer that they have experiences 
that are similar to your own. When 
you are burned, you feel pain and 
you engage in pain-behavior, e.g., 
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you grimace~ you flinch if the burn is 
touched~ etc., so that it is reason­
able to infer that when other people 
are burned and engage in pain­
behavior, they, too, feel pain. 
Further, the argument can be strength­
ened by determining that other people 
have nervous systems similar to your 
own. 
An argument very like this can 
be used to show that animals have 
various kinds of feelings, particular­
ly pain. They have similar nervous 
systems to ours, and when they are 
subjected to stimuli that we find 
painful, they typically engage in 
kinds of behavior analogous to our 
own: for example, cattle react to 
branding irons in much the same way 
in which we would react to branding 
irons. 
This is a good point at which to 
answer a fairly common objection to 
vegetarianism. It is suggested that 
if we are to care about the feelings 
of animals, why shouldn't we care 
about the feelings of plants as well? 
But if we had to worry about the 
feelings of plants, we would have to 
give up eating them as well as 
animals, and, if we did, we would die 
of starvation. But this line of 
reasoning assumes that we have good 
grounds for supposing that plants 
can have experiences and~ in parti­
cular, painful experiences. Does 
the argument from analogy support 
this? I think not. It is dubious 
whether it makes sense to say that 
plants behave at all (unless you are 
using "behave" in a metaphorical 
sense), and even if it does make 
sense to say they behave, their 
behavior is too different from that 
of human beings to support the 
argument from analogy. Furthermore, 
plants don't have central nervous 
systems, and the evidence strongly 
suggests that pain is only felt 
when there is an effect on a central 
nervous system. 
But even if plants can feel pain ­
if they suffer when they are harvest­
ed, for instance - vegetarianism 
would still seem to be better than 
our present meat-eating practices 
because you don't need to harvest as 
much grain to feed people if you give 
it to them directly as you do if it 
is fed to animals and then eaten. 
You can feed a number of times as 
many people using grain directly as 
you can if you feed it to ~nimals
and then use them as meat. l Many 
philosophers don't think that the 
argument from analogy is successful,2 
and they give alternative justifica­
tions for the claim that other human 
beings have minds. These other 
justifications, however, would seem 
to work as well to show that animals 
have minds as they do to show that 
other human beings do. 
Are experiments ever justifiable 
without the subject's consent? 
If there is no good reason for 
regarding animal suffering as less 
important than human suffering, a 
minimum requirement for the justifi­
cation of an animal experiment is 
that it either (1) be reasonable to 
expect that the experiment will cause 
less suffering than it will prevent; 
or (2) that, even if it is likely 
that the particular experiment will 
fail, the enormous gain in prevent­
ing future suffering that would be 
made if it were successful makes the 
gamble worthwhile even when the 
animal suffering caused by the 
experiment is taken into account. 
This requirement would almost 
certainly eliminate most animal 
experiments, but there would clearly 
remain a considerable number of 
experiments in which it would be 
reasonable to suppose that the 
requirement would be satisfied. Are 
any other requirements in order? 
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In the case of human beings, it is some­
times regarded as obvious that no human 
being should ever be experimented on 
without his own consent. This may not 
be as obvious as it seems, but for 
the time being let's accept it. In 
the case of human beings, one can 
sometimes get consent by offering a 
reward that will lead the subject to 
accept the risk and distress of the 
experiment, and there are also some 
people who will consent for idealistic 
reasons, who are willing to make a 
personal sacrifice in the hope of 
preventing or alleviating the suffering 
of others. But in the case of 
animals, getting consent is out of the 
question: you can't explain the 
dangers to them, you can't explain the 
object of the experiment, and you 
can't tell them about the reward you 
propose to give them. And if none of 
these things can be explained to an 
animal, it obviously isn't going to 
consent. Does this mean that all 
experiments on animals are morally 
wrong, even those that make sense 
when the suffering of all sentient 
beings is taken into account? 
Consider the matter of rewards. If a 
child is unable to understand the 
possible reward for taking a certain 
risk or for undergoing certain 
suffering, we sometimes feel justified 
in forcing him to do so because it is 
for his or her own good. If, for 
example, a child needs a painful 
operation, we may feel entitled to 
perform it without his or her consent 
provided we are in a better position 
to determine what is in the child's 
long-term interests than he or she is. 
Could a similar situation arise with 
animals? In the case of the child, 
the good things come after the bad 
thing (the operation) rather than 
before it. This condition can't be 
met for an animal if the experiment 
will result in its death. Still, not 
all animal experiments are expected to 
end in death; sometimes there is no 
danger of death, and sometimes the 
danger is low enough so that it would 
be reasonable for an animal to take 
the risk involved, provided an 
adequate reward were given afterwards. 
In such cases, there could be moral 
grounds for conducting the animal 
experiment without its consent which 
were as good as those for performing 
the operation on the child. It is, 
of course, more difficult to think of 
rewards for animals than for human 
beings. For human beings it is easy: 
most of us want a great many things 
that money can buy. Still, even 
though it is hard to think of adequate 
rewards for animals, it should be 
possible with a bit of ingenuity. For 
example, if you captured an animal in 
a place that provided a poor environ­
ment for it because the food supply 
was inadequate, or because it didn't 
provide the animal with an opportunity 
to engage in some of its natural 
activities, you could as a reward move 
it after the experiment to a more 
suitable environment. Or if an animal 
was likely to be exposed to a certain 
disease, the reward could be an 
inoculation against it. If the 
experiment wasn't very risky, the 
animal's prospects for survival might 
be better with the whole package 
involving the risk of the experiment 
and the protection of the inoculation 
than they would be without it. 
But in the case of many experi­
ments, the animal is likely to die or 
to be so much worse off because of 
the effects of the experiment that 
nothing you could do for him after 
the experiment would leave him as 
well off then as he would have been 
if you had left him alone. If we 
felt that such experiments could 
never be conducted, we would be 
barred from performing many experi­
ments that can be expected to pre­
vent a great deal more suffering 
than they would cause, so this is a 
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matter that deserves careful considera­
tion. An important thing to note is 
that most animals that are subjected 
to experiments are bred for that 
very purpose. If it were not for the 
animal breeders, the parents of the 
future subjects of experiments would 
not have mated with one another, or 
at the very least, would have mated 
at different times. For this reason 
the animals destined to be subjects 
of many, and perhaps most, fatal 
experiments would not have existed 
at all if someone hadn't planned to 
perform those experiments. A large 
portion of animals now raised for 
experiments would have been better 
off if they had never been born. But 
this could be changed. It is possible 
to raise animals to be used for 
experiments in such a way that their 
lives as a whole, though shorter than 
the normal life of an animal of 
their species, would be better than 
no life at all. Insisting on such 
a requirement would, of course, make 
such experiments a good deal more 
expensive but from the point of view 
of those of us who stand to benefit 
from such experiments, that would be 
much better than banning them 
altogether. There is the further 
advantage that it would give experi­
menters a financial incentive to 
think twice before subjecting animals 
to fatal experiments. 
Would such an arrangement really 
provide us with a satisfactory way 
out of the moral dilemma with which 
we seemed to be confronted? Would 
it enable us to carryon those 
experiments that make sense in terms 
of the overall goal of decreasing 
the suffering of sentient beings with­
out infringing on what might be taken 
to be a basic right - the right to 
protection from experiments that 
could not be made part of a package 
that it would be reasonable for the 
subject to accept? The argument in 
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favor of the experimenter would be 
that in giving the animal a good life 
before the experiment (when it 
wouldn't otherwise have had any life 
at all), he is conferring a benefit 
that outweighs the harm that comes 
later. It might be objected that 
you aren't benefiting an animal when 
you give it life, even if the life 
is on the whole worth living. But 
why not? Surely it makes sense to 
say that you are glad that you were 
born? And it won't do to object 
that it doesn't make sense to compare 
existence with non-existence, because 
it does make sense to compare being 
alive with being dead and to express 
a strong preference for being alive. 
It might be objected, too, that it 
is wrong to bring something into the 
world under a sentence of death. 
But we are all under sentence of 
death: we are all mortal. The 
objection can be re-stated: it is 
wrong to bring anything into the 
world under sentence of an unnatural 
death. It can also be argued that 
the experimenter was guilty of 
"species ism" in that he was prepared 
to do something to animals that he 
would not be willing to do to human 
beings. Clearly we wouldn't be 
willing to bring human beings into 
the world to serve as subjects of 
fatal experiments. Are we guilty of 
species ism then if we are willing to 
do this to animals? 
I believe that in this case we 
are not because there are a number of 
morally relevant differences. First 
of all, if we had such a practice 
regarding adult human beings or even 
relatively young children, the people 
who were to serve as subjects for 
such experiments would know what was 
in store for them whereas animals 
do not and are therefore spared the 
mental anguish human beings would 
suffer in anticipation. Secondly, 
although I have argued that animal 
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pain is not less important than that 
of human beings, this is perfectly 
compatible with holding that it is 
far more important to preserve the 
lives of human beings than the lives 
of animals because human beings 
characteristically have far richer 
lives than animals. Thirdly, because 
it is more important to preserve 
human and animal lives, it is desir­
able for us to have particularly 
strong feelings of revulsion towards 
the killing of innocent human 
beings. 3 
Two final points should be made. 
First, it is important to determine 
whether animal experiments involving 
suffering or death are always wrong, 
or whether at least a small fraction 
of them are justifiable because it 
is almost certain that if one bars 
all such experiments, at least some 
discoveries that would prevent more 
suffering than is caused to the 
animal in terms of the overall goal 
of minimizing suffering for all 
sentient beings will be blocked. If 
one grants that animal experimenta­
tion (even that which results in 
the animal's death) may be justifiable 
where it would prevent more suffer­
ing than the experiment causes, one 
is no longer open to the most 
plausible objection of those who 
support our present laboratory 
practices. Secondly, it is now 
possible to obtain much of the infor­
mation that has hitherto been gained 
from experimenting on animals by 
alternative techniques which are not 
only more accurate and reliable but 
frequently less expensive. Obviously 
these developments should be 
publicized, particularly because the 
large industry which has developed 
for breeding experimental animals 
has a natural interest in opposing 
the use of alternative techniques. 
Do the interests of human beings 
always take precedence over the 
interests of animals? 
It has been claimed that although 
the interests of animals should be 
respected, the answer to this question 
is obviously "yes". On first glance, 
this seems eminently reasonable. 4 
After all, it is admitted that the 
interests of animals should be 
respected and surely it is no more 
than commonsense to suppose that when 
there is a conflict between the 
interests of human beings and animals, 
the interests of human beings should 
take precedence. And think of the 
advantages to be gained from recogniz­
ing this. In the preceding discussion 
of animal experiments, it was argued 
that experiments designed to test 
the safety of new luxury goods such 
as cosmetics should be abandoned, 
that we should simply give up those 
luxury goods. But that would mean 
not merely that some women would have 
to do without certain new cosmetics, 
it would also mean that people 
wouldn't be employed making and 
selling them. But if it is agreed 
that the interests of human beings 
should always take precedence over 
the interests of animals, women 
could have new cosmetics and 
cosmetic-workers their jobs. But can 
we really accept the principle that 
whenever there is a conflict between 
human and animal interests, human 
interests should prevail, no matter 
how much animal suffering would be 
required? Consider the tasty liver­
paste known as pate de foie gras. 
In order to make it, geese are force­
fed until their livers burst. Or 
consider boiled crabs and lobsters. 
The common practice is to place them, 
still alive, in boiling water, and 
there is good evidence now available 
to show that they do not die 
instantaneously or painlessly, but go 
on suffering for several minutes. 
{Putting them in tepid water and 
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help; it prolongs the process.) In 
both these cases our present practices 
serve the interest of human beings so 
the principle of giving human interests 
precedence is forced to sanction them. 
The obvious conclusion is that the 
principle is wrong. 
Would animals be worse off in a 
world of vegetarians? 
Consider the following rhetorical 
question: "If everyone became a 
vegetarian, would there still be any 
sheep or cattle in the world, well 
cared for and guarded against 
starvation?" The obvious answer is 
that probably very few of them would 
exist unless they were kept as pets. 
Left to themselves, they would be 
hard put to it to survive. Further­
more, even if some sheep and cattle 
would exist in a vegetarian world, 
a great many more who would have 
been raised for food in a meat-eating 
world would never be born. 
Now suppose that these animals 
that would never be born in a 
vegetarian world had been born and 
were given lives that were worth 
living before they were killed for 
meat. Isn't it better that they 
should have been born and given 
shortened lives than that they should 
have no life at all? If this is so, 
then isn't it better, even from the 
point of view of the animals who will 
eventually be eaten, that the world 
should not become vegetarian? Isn't 
it in fact wrong to encourage 
vegetarianism because, insofar as you 
are successful, you will prevent the 
existence of animals who would 
otherwise be born and live relatively 
happy (although shortened) lives? 
There are two main objections to 
this. First, the argument rests on 
the supposition that animals raised 
for meat are characteristically given 
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relatively happy lives and, in a world 
in which factory-farming is increas­
ingly common, that supposition is 
debatable, to say the least. Secondly, 
the argument rests on the supposition 
that it is wrong (or at least prima 
facie wrong) to prevent the existence 
of beings that would have happy lives. 
Holding this view does not require 
you to hold that it is always wrong 
to practise birth control or even 
that it is always wrong to have an 
abortion because there might be 
countervailing factors that make 
abortion or birth control acceptable 
or even obligatory. In an over­
populated world, such countervailing 
factors are increasingly likely to 
be present. Overpopulation also 
provides a reason for not raising 
animals for meat because when you do 
so you get only a fraction as much 
food value from the meat as you would 
get if the grain needed to raise the 
animal had been given directly to 
human beings. 
Because of the last consideration 
alone, it seems that even if it is 
prima facie wrong to encourage 
vegetarianism (thereby preventing the 
existence of relatively happy 
animals), when everything is taken 
into consideration it may not be 
wrong on the whole to do so, and it 
may even be obligatory. Still the 
question remains as to whether it is 
at least prima facie wrong to prevent 
the existence of animals who would 
have relatively happy lives. In 
considering this question, it will be 
useful to construct an imaginary case 
in which the claim that it would be 
wrong to prevent the existence of 
animals even though they are eventu­
ally to be killed will be made as 
strong as possible. Let's suppose, 
first, thgt there is no food shortage 
so that we can ignore the claim that 
grain used to feed animals should be 
given instead directly to human 
beings. Let's confine ourselves to 
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those animals who couldn't survive on 
their own, and let's suppose that 
instead of raising them on factory 
farms, they are given an idyllic 
existence. Let's suppose further 
that the only way in which it is 
commercially feasible to raise them 
is for food. Imagine that a reformer 
makes the proposal that these animals 
are not to be killed for meat but that, 
since society cannot afford to take 
care of them, they be allowed to fend 
for themselves. Clearly, this would 
not be in the animals' interest 
(since the case stipulates that they 
cannot survive on their own), 
whereas if they were not set free, 
most of them would enjoy many more 
years of an agreeable life (even 
though they had to die at the end of 
it) . 
Now suppose instead that a 
farmer proposes that he breed some 
pigs, and that he agrees to give 
them a good life and as humane a 
death as he can contrive, provided 
he is allowed to hutcher them 
eventually. It is hard to see why 
even someone particularly concerned 
with the pigs' welfare should oppose 
his plan. After all, this batch of 
pigs will not be born if they aren't 
meant to be butchered. Wouldn't 
the pigs, once they were born, be 
glad (if they could understand the 
situation) that they had been born 
even if a necessary condition for 
their life is eventual death? After 
all, we are all going to die, and 
most of us will die much worse deaths 
than these animals. 
Still, it might be replied that 
in order for it to be wrong to 
prevent the birth of someone, you must 
have an obligation to him, and you 
can't have an obligation to a non­
existent being. But consider the 
following case. Because a prospective 
mother has an abnormal condition, any 
child she conceives who is allowed to 
be born will have a wretched life. 
Such a person would surely have an 
obligation to prevent the conception 
of such a child. Surely it would be 
wrong to conceive it, and wrong, if 
it were conceived, to allow it to be 
born. This seems to show either 
that we can have obligations to 
non-existent beings or, at the very 
least, that it can be wrong to do 
certain things because of their 
effects on non-existent beings. (If 
it is objected that what makes the 
conception wrong is not the baby's 
suffering but the trouble it will 
cause others, the example could be 
changed by specifying that the child's 
case be of medical interest; this 
benefit to others will offset the 
trouble to them so that in this case 
conceiving the child would be wrong 
only because of that child's 
suffering. ) 
Consider the following argument: 
1. It is morally bad per se to 
add miserable creatures to the world. 
2. Suppose that it is not morally 
good per se to add happy creatures to 
the world. 
3. Then it is not morally per­
missible to add a group of creatures 
to the world (taking only the group's 
welfare into account) if some 
members of the group are miserable, 
no matter how many are happy. 
4. But it is permissible to add 
such a group (taking only their 
welfare into account) if enough of 
them will be happy. 
5. Therefore it is morally good 
per se to add happy creatures to 
the world. 
A number of objections have been 
raised to this argument. (I should 
say before describing the controversy 
that it has been carried on in terms 
of people rather than the broader 
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category including animals as well and 
I will describe it in terms of people, 
but the arguments apply equally well 
to animals.) Bennett claims that we 
don't need the happiness of the happy 
offspring to balance against the 
unhappiness of the miserable ones; 
that we can use instead the antici­
pated gain in happiness for the 
parents. S Bennett raised this 
objection against a version of the 
argument in which it was not as 
apparent as it is in the present 
version that only the interests of 
those added to the world are taken 
into consideration. Clearly his 
objection wouldn't work against this 
version. 6 William Anglim suggests on 
the other hand that the argument only 
shows that it is a supererogatory 
good deed to add happy creatures to 
the wor1d. 7 Anglim raised this 
objection within a utilitarian frame­
work, and I responded8 that within 
such a framework it wouldn't count as 
supererogatory to add happy people to 
the world unless doing so is good in 
itself. For a utilitarian, an action 
couldn't be supererogatory unless it 
had a good consequence. It would be 
supererogatory because it demanded 
an undue amount of sacrifice from 
the agent in comparison with the 
value of the consequence for others; 
rather than because it was not a 
good thing to bring about that sort 
of consequence. Michael Bayles 
misinterprets the argument taking its 
conclusion to be that we can have 
obligations concerning possible 
persons and objects that the premiss 
to the effect that it is morally bad 
to make possible miserable persons 
actual assumes the consequent. 9 But 
the argument is directed to philoso­
phers who, like Bayles himself, 
suppose that it is a bad thing to make 
miserable possible persons actual. A 
philosopher who rejected that premiss 
would suppose that the argument was 
unsound but it's a difficult premiss 
to reject. 
I know of no successful refutation 
to this argument. 10 Still, the over­
all argument against vegetarianism 
would not succeed unless it could be 
shown that the majority of animals 
bred for food would probably be given 
happy lives, and this seems unlikely. 
Furthermore, it is very difficult in 
an overpopulated world in which many 
people are starving to justify 
feeding animals to make them into 
food, when giving grain directly to 
human beings would feed several times 
as many as could be fed with the 
slaughtered animals. The opponent 
of vegetarianism may succeed in show­
ing that vegetarianism is prima facie 
wrong because it would prevent the 
existence of some happy animals. 
However, that is not enough to show 
that it is wrong on the whole 
because it would probably also pre­
vent the births of a much larger 
number of unhappy animals. Finally, 
even if he should satisfy us as to 
the welfare of animals, he would 
still have to convince us that the 
overall benefit to animals would 
exceed the harm done to human beings 
by producing food in an extremely 
inefficient way when millions of 
people are starving. 
Can animals have rights? 
Some people suppose that not only 
do animals lack certain rights, but 
they are incapable of having any 
rights at all. Most of these people 
would nevertheless think that we have 
an obligation not to do certain things 
to animals (such as torturing them) 
and many of them would hold that we 
have obligations to do certain things 
for animals. This is important 
because having rights is only an 
advantage insofar as it gives others 
the obligation to do certain things 
for you and to refrain from doing 
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certain other things to you. For 
instance, there would be no advan­
tage in having the right to freedom 
of speech in religious matters if no 
one had an obligation to refrain from 
preventing you from speaking about 
your religious beliefs. Or, to take 
another example, there would be no 
advantages for Canadians in having 
the right to freedom from hunger 
unless some other people had (or in 
some situation would have) an obliga­
tion to provide needy Canadians with 
food. 
It is commonly felt that certain 
rights should be respected no matter 
what the circumstances, e.g., the 
right never to be punished when you 
are innocent or the right never to be 
tortured. There are many people who 
would feel however that, in extreme 
circumstances, even such basic rights 
as these may be violated. (Mightn't 
it be justifiable, for example, to 
torture one person if the only 
alternative was letting a great many 
people be tortured?) 
There are also rights that most 
of us would agree can be overridden 
in abnormal situation: for example, 
the right to be told the truth or the 
right to have promises kept. And 
finally, there are rights that are 
fairly commonly overridden, such. as 
the right to an advanced education 
for those who are sufficiently 
talented to benefit by it. In a 
society that is not particularly 
affluent, the obligation of the state 
to provide such an education for some 
citizens may be overridden by its 
obligation to provide for the more 
basic needs of other citizens. It 
is important to remember that there 
are these weaker sorts of rights as 
well as (possibly) the strongest sort 
of right (those which can never be 
overridden) because even if one doesn't 
grant that animals can have the 
strongest sort of right, it doesn't 
E8A 11/3 
follow that they have no rights at 
all. 
Turning back to the relation 
between rights and obligations 
towards those who have rights, imagine 
two people who agree on what obliga­
tions we have to animals (what things 
we have obligations to do for them, 
and what things we have obligations 
not to do to them), but who disagree 
on whether animals have rights or 
not. For an animal concerned with 
his own welfare, it wouldn't matter 
which of these two positions is taken. 
Or suppose that Jones thinks that we 
have more obligations towards animals 
than Smith does, but that Smith 
believes that animals have rights 
while Jones does not. An animal with 
an eye to his own interest would 
prefer to have people believe what 
Jones does, despite the fact that he 
thinks animals have no rights. More 
concretely, suppose that Jones thinks 
that even though animals have no 
rights, we should never kill or 
torture them while Smith thinks that 
animals have a right not to be 
tortured but that it is permissible 
to kill them. A friend of animals 
would be well-advised to prefer 
Jones' view, the no-rights view, 
because the consequences of accept­
ing Smith's view would obviously be 
far worse for animals. I myself 
believe that where there are rights 
there are corresponding obligations, 
and, conversely, that where there are 
obligations there are corresponding 
rights (though this requires defense 
which is beyond the scope of this 
paper.) At any rate, the crucial 
thing for animal welfare is that we 
have some obligations to them. 
Some philosophers who think that 
animals have no rights but that we 
have obligations to them think that 
these obligations are based on the 
fact that animals have interests. 
Although I disagree with the claim 
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that animals lack rights, this theory 
does at least allow for the proper 
treatment of animals. Others who 
think that animals have no rights 
think that our obligations towards 
them are based, not on their interests 
but (1) on agreements with other human 
beings (and, further, that agreements 
are the only source of rights and 
obligations); or (2) on the need to 
preserve our own good character. 
Theory (1) grounds all rights 
and obligations on agreements: in 
order to have a right, you must either 
have made an agreement giving you that 
right, or you must at least be 
capable of making such an agreement. 
An objectionable consequence of (1) is 
that it leaves not only animals but 
babies and the insane with no rights. 
Even so, since we can still have 
obligations towards them, it is 
perhaps enough. But there is still 
an unacceptable consequence of (1). 
Suppose that in a given society no 
one cared about the welfare of the 
insane or infants, and that there 
was no agreement, for example, that 
they should not be tortured. It 
would follow that in that society it 
would not merely not be regarded as 
wrong to torture babies and the 
insane, it wouldn't be wrong. 
As for view (2), that we have 
obligations towards animals because 
treating them badly is injurious to 
one's character rather than because 
it is injurious to animals, the 
claim would seem to be that one won't 
have the sort of character that will 
lead to treating human beings well 
unless one has the sort of character 
that leads to treating animals well. 
But this is surely false: many people 
who have been models of virtue in 
their treatment of other human beings 
have done or allowed others to do 
dreadful things to animals. One can 
unfortunately be virtuous towards 
the members of some in-group while 
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glVlng no thought to the members of 
an out-group. (This is, of course, 
also a problem for the dealings 
of human beings with each other, and 
an important kind of moral progress 
consists in making the boundaries of 
what one takes to be the in-group 
broader and broader - to include not 
only one's family, one's town, one's 
country, all mankind, but, fpr animal 
liberation, to include all sentient 
beings. ) 
Why should I become a vegetarian? 
Some readers may feel that while 
it would be desirable for our society 
as a whole to become vegetarian, 
nothing can be gained by particular 
individuals becoming vegetarian so 
that they personally have no obliga­
tion to do so. A similar argument 
could have been given to defend the 
owning of slaves, and, if everyone had 
accepted it, the institution of 
slavery would almost certainly have 
survived. It's theoretically 
possible, of course, that people who 
took advantage of slavery while it 
existed would still have voted for 
its abolition. Still, it is unlikely 
that a society of slave-owners would 
vote for the abolition of slavery, 
and the same holds for a society of 
meat-eaters and the abolition of 
raising animals for meat. Further­
more, if in becoming a vegetarian you 
show that a vegetarian can have a 
healthy and enjoyable diet, your 
example tends to encourage others. 
And the more vegetarians there are, 
the easier it is to be one because 
they create a demand for vegetarian 
restaurants and grocery stores. Also, 
when people act in accord with certain 
moral beliefs, they characteristically 
become more deeply committed to those 
beliefs. In the case of animal 
rights, it is particularly important 
that we should be deeply concerned 
because, unlike homosexuals or women 
or racial minorities, animals are 
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dumb: they literally cannot speak 
for their own rights and so we should 
speak for them. 
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should be utilitarian, I agree with 
Brandt in holding that a society whose 
members were guided by a pluralistic 
code selected on the basis of utili­
tarian considerations would be much 
happier than one whose members 
endeavored to follow act utilitarian­
ism. The two main reasons for this 
are that it would be very difficult 
to predict the behavior of other 
people in an act utilitarian society 
because it would be very difficult 
to determine which actions they 
would think of as maximizing utility, 
and that it would be far easier to 
rationalize in one's own favor if one 
were guided by an act utilitarian 
code than if one were guided by the 
right sort of pluralistic code. I 
also agree with Brandt in thinking 
that it is important for us to have 
strong feelings of revulsion associat­
ed with the violation of some of the 
more important parts of such a code. 
E8A 11/3 
For further dis.cuss.ion of this view, 
cf. Richard Brandt: A Theory of the 
Good and the Right (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1979) chapter 15. 
4 Kai Nielson takes this view 
in "Some Puzzles about Formulating 
Utilitarianism," Ratio, Vol. XV, 
no. 2, pp. 256-62. I attack it in 
"Towards a Satisfactory Formulation 
of Utilitarianism," Ratio, XIX, no. 1, 
pp. 68-9. 
5 Jonathan Bennett, "On Maximiz­
ing Happiness," in Obligation to 
Future Generations, edited by 
R. I, Sikora and Brian Barry, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1978, 
pp. 61-73. 
6 Sikora, "Is It Wrong to Pre­
vent the Existence of Future Genera­
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7 William Anglim, "Repugnant 
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8 Sikora, "Utilitarianism, 
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
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9 Michael Bayles, Morality and 
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10There is, however, a counter­
argument which is worthy of serious 
attention. If it's a good thing to 
add people with a positive happiness 
level to the world even if their 
happiness level is barely positive 
and people already here should there­
fore be prepared to make sacrifices 
to do so, it would be possible in 
theory at any rate for them to be 
required to go on making sacrifices 
till the world declined from a high 
happiness average to one that was 
barely above neutrality. But such a 
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world would be inferior to the world   
with which they began so view

the  
that it is a good thing to happy

add  
.. people to the world must be mistaken . 
The view that we should aim at a world 
with the highest possible average level 
of happiness avoids the objectionable 
conclusion (Derek Parfit calls it "the 
repugnant conclusion") but it has the 
grossly counterintuitive consequence 
that under certain circumstances it 
would be wrong to add happy people 
to the world even if doing so would 
raise the happiness level of all those 
already there. I have argued that all 
other views that are at all plausible 
have a consequence that is closely 
analagous to the repugnant conclusion 
and that is, if anything, more 
objectionable than it is. McMahan 
questions this analogy in his review 
of Obligations to Future Generations 
in the October 1981 issue of Ethics 
to which I respond in the same issue. 
The main theme of my argument is 
that if it isn't a good thing to add 
happy people to the world and if there 
were a few people with a very low level 
of happiness in the world who could 
either help each other to be a bit 
better off or bring about a new race 
of very happy people, they should do 
the former rather than the latter 
and thus leave us with a miserable 
world rather than a happy one. It is 
unfortunately impossible to develop 
this response properly without 
devoting more space to it. I have 
attempted here to briefly suggest the 
lines of present controversy which, 
although they have been carried on 
specifically in terms of people 
apply equally well to animals. 
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